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Comments
BRANZBURG V. HAYES: A NEED FOR
STATUTORY PROTECTION OF NEWS SOURCES
On October 4, 1972, Peter J. Bridge began serving an indeterminate
sentence in the Essex County Jail, New Jersey.1 Mr. Bridge, once a
reporter for the now defunct Newark News, was sent to jail because
he refused to answer questions asked him by a grand jury investigat-
ing corruption within the Newark Housing Authority. Peter J. Bridge
is not alone in declining, as a journalist, to testify before a grand
jury. Paul Branzburg, a newspaperman for the Louisville Courier-
Journal,2 would not disclose the source of his information before a
Franklin County, Kentucky Grand Jury which was convened to in-
vestigate drug abuse. Mr. Branzburg was subpoenaed before the
grand jury because of a newspaper article he had written which
included an interview with persons making hashish in Franklin
County. The legal battle between newsmen claiming a privilege,3 and
courts, grand juries, and legislative investigators seeking information
has been a long struggle, taking different forms along the way. This
comment will focus upon the forms that this conflict has taken and
the possible restraints that newsmen now face in light of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes.
4
COMMON LAW APPROACH
Initially, reporters claimed a privilege against testifying regarding
the source of their information on common law principles. However,
this claim has been consistently rejected by the courts, generally on
1 NEwsvE, October 16, 1972, at 60.2 Mr. Branzburg is now employed by the Detroit Free Press.
3 The issue of the newsman s privilege usually arises in four situations:
(1) where a newsman has written and his paper has published a story
exposing illegal activity and the district attorney or attorney general
calls him be ore a grand jury to divulge names or information so that
the government can prosecute the criminal violation or at least investigate
the activity; (2) where the statements used by a newsman are relevant
to a civil case and he is subpoenaed to testify at the request of one of
the litigants; (3) where either the prosecutor or the defendant seeks the
newsmans testimony in a criminal trial of a third person (other than
the informant); and (4) where the subject matter relates to govern-
ment activity and the newsman is questioned by a legislative committee.
See Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsman Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18, 20 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Guest &
Stanzler].
4408 U.S. 665 (1972).
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
the basis that it does not satisfy Wigmore's prerequisites to establish-
ing a privilege against compulsory testimony.5 The following are
Wigmore's conditions:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed;
2. The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the com-
munity ought to be sedulously fostered;
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of the litigation. 6
Adjudication under the common law required a reporter to
testify concerning information received in confidence and to disclose
the identity of his informants. In 1911, a Georgia reporter refused to
reveal the basis of his information on the premise that it would
cause him to forfeit an estate, i.e., it would cause him to lose his
means of earning a living.7 In rejecting the reporter's contention, the
Georgia Supreme Court stated:
If the views sought to be maintained in this case were permitted
to prevail the power to ascertain truth in judicial investigation,
and to administer justice accordingly would depend not upon the
law of the land, but upon the private promises of secrecy on the
part of witnesses, or upon the wishes or orders of their em-
ployers.
8
Thus, in the opinion of this court, the argument for a newsman's
privilege failed to satisfy Wigmore's four requirements noted above.
Judges operating under the common law approach have placed
the same duty upon reporters as has been placed upon all citizens.9
Judicial notice of this duty was taken in Cleim v. State,10 where the
Florida Supreme Court held that members of the press do not have
a privilege of communication with informants and may be held in
contempt for refusing to reveal their source of information.
The common law thus required a reporter to testify concerning
information received in confidence and to reveal the identity of
5 Note, The Newsman's Privilege and the Constitution, 23 S.C.L. REV. 486,
445 (1971).
6 8 J. WscMonE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
7 Plunkett v. Hamilton, 70 S.E. 781 (Ga. 1911).
8Id. at 786.
9 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 438 (1931), where the Court
stated that it is "beyond controversy that one o? the duties which the citizen
owes to his government is to support the administration of justice by attending
its courts and giving his testimony whenever properly summoned."
10 52 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1950).
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informants because of the priority of the legal considerations involved.
Undaunted by this failure to establish a privilege on common law
principles, the press began to seek other legal principles on which
to base their claim.
CoNs'rTIToNAL APPROACH
The theory of the constitutional approach is that the breadth of
the frst amendment" protects the newsgathering process of the press
and that the policy of the free flow of news outweighs the policy of
compulsory testimony.' 2 Essentially, the argument is made that news
reporting consists of a succession of events and that the gathering
process is the indispensable first step which should be protected by
the flrst amendment.' 3 Most courts which have considered the first
amendment argument have rejected it, holding that the freedom of
the press is not absolute and that the administration of justice requires
that newsmen be compelled to testify.
Two cases, Garland v. Torre'4 and In re Goodfader's Appeal,
15
illustrate the attitude the courts have generally taken when confronted
with this constitutional argument. In Garland, columnist Marie Torre
attributed to a CBS "network executive" several statements about the
plaintiff, Judy Garland, which were alleged to be false, defamatory
and damaging to the plaintiffs professional career. CBS denied
making the alleged statements or causing them to be published. Miss
Torre was held in criminal contempt for refusing to divulge the
identity of the network executive who allegedly made the defamatory
statements. The court held that there was neither a constitutional
nor an evidentiary privilege to refuse to answer the question. In so
holding, the court stated the manner in which the problem is to be
approached:
What must be determined is whether the interest to be served
by compelling the testimony of the witness in the present case
justifies some impairment of this first amendment freedom. 16
Finally, the court determined that, in balancing the impairment of
the freedom of the press and the need for sufficient evidence to reach
a just decision, the need of the court outweighed the restriction placed
on the freedom of the press.
11 U.S. CONSr. amend. 1.
2 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 3, at 29.
13 See Note, Constitutional Protection for the Newsman's Work Product, 6
HARv. Crv. RiGrs-CrW. Lm. L. REv. 119 (1971).
'o a259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
15 367 P.2d 471 (Hawaii 1961).
1Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1958).
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The second illustration, In re Goodfade's Appeal,'7 involved the
refusal of a reporter on cross examination to disclose where, or from
whom, he had obtained information of a possible attempt by the
Civil Service Commission of the City and County of Honolulu to
fire the personnel director of the Commission. Although the Hawaii
Supreme Court noted that first amendment freedoms should be
protected from any possible infringement, it stated that they are not
absolute. This court, like the court of Garland, asserted that the
approach should be a balancing one based upon the circumstances
involved in the case:
[D]espite the broad scope and protective status of the first amend-
ment freedoms and privileges, it is clear that none of them is
absolute, and that whether, in any given case an asserted right
under that amendment will prevail or not depends upon the par-
ticular circumstances involved and the weighing and balancing
of the protection afforded by the right asserted against the
purposes that would be defeated or denied by recognition or
the freedom or privilege. The private or individual interest in-
volved must in each case be weighed in balance against the
public interest affected.'8
Contrary to the above examples and to the decisions rendered by
a majority of courts which have considered the question of a news-
man's privilege under the first amendment was the decision reached
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Cald-
well v. United States.'9 As a black reporter for the New York
Times, defendant Caldwell was able to gain the confidence of certain
Black Panther party members. Through his articles he gave the public
an insight into the party which had not been previously presented.
20
Caldwell was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury and was
held in contempt for disregarding the subpoena.21 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was nothing to which
the journalist could testify beyond that which he had already made
public -.2 2 The court further noted that Caldwell's mere appearance
would destroy his capacity as a news reporter. In the Caldwell case
the contention was not that the first amendment afforded an absolute
17867 P.2d 472 (Hawaii 1961).
18 Id. at 478.
19 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972).
20 Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEo. L.J. 867, 1080
(1972).2
1A lication of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See note 19
supra, an accompanying text.22United States v. Caldwell. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
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privilege but rather, as the court concluded, that the first amend-
ment provided protection when a compelling need was not demon-
strated.23
To resolve the controversy between the different approaches de-
veloped by the lower courts the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Branzburg v. Hayes.24 As noted earlier, Branzburg was being ques-
tioned about his reporting of drug abuse in Franklin County, Kentucky,
when he refused to identify the people he had interviewed. In a
five-four decision the Supreme Court held that the freedoms of
speech and press guaranteed by the first amendment are not abridged
when newsmen are required to appear and testify before state or
federal grand juries. Speaking for the majority, Justice White noted
that neither is there constitutional immunity from grand jury sub-
poenas nor first amendment protection from disclosing, to a grand
jury, information received in confidence:
It is clear that the first amendment does not invalidate every
incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforce-
ment of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability. Under
prior cases otherwise valid laws serving substantial public interests
may be enforced against the press as against others, despite the
possible burden that may be imposed.25
Justice White determined that evidence that the "flow of news" would
be restricted was unclear as was evidence of the extent to which
informers would be deterred from furnishing information to re-
porters if no immunity were granted. No longer the activist Warren
Court the Supreme Court may have decided as it did in order to
leave such matters to the legislative branch of government.2 6 After
the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg the statutory solution re-
mains the only source of protection for the newsman's privilege.
STATUTORY APPROACH
Presently eighteen states have recognized the newsman's privilege
23 See Comment, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 617, 628 (1971).
24408 U.S. 665 (1972).
25 Id. at 682.
26 At the federal level Congress has freedom to determine whether a
statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion
standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal
with the evil discerned and, equally important, to refashion those rules
as experience from time to time may dictate. There is also merit in
leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion
their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respectto the relations between law enforcement officials and press in their
own areas. Id. at 706.
1973]
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by statute.2 7 These statutes offer varying degrees of protection, from
the seemingly absolute privilege in Alabama 28 to the limited protec-
tion in Illinois, where the court may deny the privilege to a news-
man if other available sources of evidence have been exhausted and
the information is essential to the protection of the public interest.
29
Before the privilege granted by the Indiana statute may be invoked
the reporter must be employed by a newspaper which has been
published for five consecutive years in the same city and has a cir-
culation of two percent of the population of the county in which
it is published.3 0 Another example of limitation of the privilege ex-
tended to a newsman's testimony is the New Mexico statute which
allows the testimonial privilege to be denied if disclosure of the
information is deemed essential to prevent an injustice.3 '
No statutory privilege for newsmen exists on the federal level at
the present time. However, in a 1970 address by John Mitchell, then
Attorney General, federal guidelines were announced for issuing
subpoenas. These guidelines limit the conditions under which a
subpoena should be issued. A final caveat, however, that situations
are foreseeable where the guidelines would not be applicable, could
operate to render the enumerated guidelines useless.
32
2 7
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 09.25.150-
.220 (Supp. 1971); Ariz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1971); AnK. STAT.
ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Supp. 1972); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REv.
STAT. § 421.100 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 45, §§ 1451-53 (Supp. 1972); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1965); MiCH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 767.5a (1968); MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. tit. 93, §§ 601-1-602-2 (1964); Nxv. REv. STAT. tit. 4, §
49.275 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
20-1-12.1 (1970); N.Y. CivrL RIGTS LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1970);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp.
1971).2 8 ALA. CoDE lit. 7, § 370 (1960) provides:
No person engaged in, connected with, or employed on any news-
paper (or radio broadcasting station or television station) while engaged
in a news gathering capacity shall be compelled to disclose in any
legal proceeding or trial, before any court or before a grand jury of
any court, or before the presiding officer of any tribunal or his agent
or agents, or before any committee of the legislature or elsewhere, the
sources of any information procured or obtained by him and published
in the newspaper (or broadcast by any broadcasting station or televised
by any television station) on which he is engaged, connected with, or
employed.2 9 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 117 (Supp. 1972).
30 IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-1733 (1968).
31 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (1970).
32 A. There should be sufficient reason to believe that a crime has oc-
curred, from disclosures by non-press sources. The Department does
not approve of utilizing the press as a springboard for investigations.
B. There should be sufficient reason to believe that the informa-
(Continued on next page)
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In interpreting the statutory privileges and applying them to a
given fact situation, the courts have taken two routes: liberal con-
struction or narrow application, resulting in privileges of illusory
value. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of In re Taylor33
held that the statutory exemption for the testimony of reporters
must be given a broad interpretation in favor of the news media.
The court gave the statute a liberal construction because "independent
newspapers are today the principal watch dogs and protectors of
honest as well as good government." 4 On the other hand, the New
Jersey Supreme Court narrowly construed a statutory privilege when
it upheld an order to compel the editor of a newspaper to reveal his
source of information.35 The court ruled under the facts presented
that the question did not go to the source of the information but
rather to the determination of who physically transported the state-
ment to the editor. If the court had interpreted the statute in favor
of the news media, it perhaps could have justifiably expanded the
definition of the term "source" to include not only those making the
initial statements but also those who relay them to the press.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals gave an extremely narrow con-
struction to the Kentucky statute36 when it interpreted the phrase
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
tion sought is essential to a successful investigation-particularly with
reference to directly establishing guilt or innocence. The subpoena
should not be used to obtain peripheral, non-essential or speculative in-
formation.
C. The government should have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
the information from alternative non-press sources.
D. Authorization requests for subpoenas should normally be limited
to the verification of published information and to such surrounding cir-
cumstances as relate to the accuracy of the published information.
E. Great caution should be observed in requesting subpoena autho-
rization by the Attorney General for unpublished information or where
an orthodox First Amendment defense is raised or where a serious claim
of confidentiality is alleged.
F. Even subpoena authorization requests for publicity disclosed
information should be treated with care because, for example, camera-
men have recently been subjected to harassment on the grounds that
their photographs will become available to the government.
G. In any event, subpoenas should, wherever possible, be directed
at material information regarding a limited subject matter, should cover
a reasonably limited period of time, and should avoid requiring pro-
duction of a large volume of unpublished material. They should give
reasonable and timely notice of the demand for documents.
It must always be remembered that emergencies and other unusual
situations may develop where a subpoena may be submitted which does
not exactly conform to these guidelines. 7 Cum. L. REPoRTER 2461
(1970).
33 193 A.2d 181 (Pa. 1963).
34 Id. at 185.35 State v. Donovan, 30 A.2d 421 (N.J. 1943).
36Ky. REv. STAT. § 421.100 (1972).
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"source of information."37 The Court defined information "as the
things or matters which a reporter learns, 3 8 and source as "the
method by which or the person from whom he learns them" 39 With
these verbal gymnastics, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reached the
conclusion that, in the case at bar, the reporter's personal observation
was the source, and the identity of the persons making the hashish
was part of the information that Branzburg obtained. The Court
found that the statute protected only the source and not the in-
formation; therefore, the reporter could be compelled to name the
person he interviewed in the process of making hashish. In his dissent,
Justice Hill argued that the term "source of any information is a broad
comprehensive one, certainly not a technical phrase."40 He added:
[W]e have a situation requiring the balance of values and I be-
lieve as apparently did the Legislature, that the benefits to society
from thoroughly and correctly reporting current events greater
outweighs the probable and highly imaginary possibility of their
abuse under the statute.
41
One of the most reiterated arguments in favor of establishing a
statutory exemption is that absent this exemption the free flow of news
to the public would be impaired.42 The unrestrained use of the
subpoena power serves to frustrate the establishment of confidential
relationships which are necessary if the reporter is to obtain his in-
formation.43 The validity of this argument is reflected in the fre-
quency with which reporters use confidential sources in the news-
gathering process. For example, the San Francisco Chronicle uses
such sources in approximately 850-1,000 stories each year.44 In a recent
empirical study of reliance on confidential relationships, it was shown
that reporters depend on such sources for 22.2 to 84.4 percent of their
37 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970).
38 Id. at 347.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 348 (J. Hill, dissenting).
41 Id.
42 See Guest & Stanzler, supra note 3 at 44- Note, Reporters and Their
Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE LJ. 317
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Reporters and Their Sources]. Guest and Stanzler
point out that the flow of news would be inhibited since the willingness of the
informant to seek out or to communicate with the newsman and the willingness
of the newsmen to seek out informants and to transmit information received
from informants for publication would be affected.
43 Much discussion will be stifled concerning socially controversial ac-
tivities, such as illegal abortion and drug usage, for individuals will avoid
the possibility of public identification with illegal conduct. Some persons
will be reluctant to voice their opinion without assurances of anonymity
for fear of harassment and reprisal. Reporters and Their Sources, supra
note 42, at 329.
44 Guest & Stanzler, supra note 3, at 60.
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stories, 45 with governmental reporters placing the heaviest emphasis
on regular confidential sources.4 This study indicates that any limita-
tion on the use of confidential sources would restrict the flow of in-
formation to the public. The newsman-informant relationship is of
sufficient societal value to warrant protection. In addition, it is rare
that newsmen possess information that could be considered vital to
the determination of specific litigation.
47
CONCLUSION
Stripped of the possibility of constitutional protection by the
Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg, the newsman must now rely
on Congress and the state legislatures to provide him with the pro-
tection he needs to satisfactorily perform his role as the "guardian
of the public interest."48 The statutory privileges afforded newsmen
should be absolute; if the reporter cannot consistently insure the
anonymity of his sources, the fear of potential reprisals against in-
formants would be sufficient to render any privilege less than absolute,
valueless. A major premise of a democratic society is an informed
citizenry; any inhibition on the dissemination of news decreases the
information available to the public.49 For example, a government
scandal may be kept from the public because a source of information
refuses to talk, fearing that his name will be revealed and that he will
lose his patronage job. The electorate, without knowledge of the scan-
dalous activity, will retain the incumbent officeholder whereas, with
knowledge, the electorate could defeat him.50 Newsmen desire only
to keep the identity of the source confidential, not the information
itself; such a desire must have statutory endorsement so that a free
press may continue to be one of the foundations of democracy.
Richard E. Anderson
4VBlase, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MicH. L. REv.
229, 247 (1971).
46 Id. at 251.
47 Id. at 276.4 8 Desmond The Newsman's Privilege Bill, 13 ALBANY L. REv. 1, 8 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as Desmond].
49 "Apopular government without popular information or the means of
acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy or perhaps both." 6 Writings
of James Madison 398 (Hunt. ed. 1906).
GO "Anyone familiar with the history of our free press knows that newsmen
have fought corrupt judges, bungling politicians, black marketeers, and the
stealthy saboteurs of democracy through the antiseptic power of exposure." See
Desmond, supra note 48, at 8.
